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Abstract—Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) are widely
used as authentication method for systems such as Automated
Teller Machines (ATMs) and Point of Sale (PoS). Input devices
(PIN pads) usually give the user a feedback sound when a key
is pressed. In this paper, we propose an attack based on the
extraction of inter-keystroke timing from the feedback sound
when users type their PINs. Our attack is able to reach an
accuracy of 98% with a mean error of 0.13 +/-6.66 milliseconds.
We demonstrate that inter-keystroke timing significantly
improves the guessing probability of certain subsets of PINs.
We believe this represents a security problem that has to be
taken into account for secure PIN generation. Furthermore,
we identified several attack scenarios where the adversary can
exploit inter-keystroke timing and additional information about
the user or the PIN, such as typing behavior. Our results show
that combining the inter-keystroke timing with other information
drastically reduces attempts to guess a PIN, outperforming
random guessing. With our attack, we are able to guess 72% of
the 4-digit PINs within 3 attempts. We believe this poses a serious
security problem for systems that use PIN-based authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of authentication systems via Personal Identification
Number (PIN) dates back to the mid-sixties [7]. The first de-
vices to make use of this type of authentication were automatic
dispensers and control systems at petrol stations, while the first
applications in the banking sector came in 1967 with the cash
machines [9]. PINs have found great use over the years thanks
to their suitability for for resource-constrained environments
(i.e. numeric keypads instead of full keyboards) [24]. Nowadays
many people interact with devices that require authentication
through PIN in different scenarios: Automated Teller Machines
(ATMs), door-locking systems, Point of Sale (PoS), automated
fuel dispensers, vending machines and mobile phones. For
what concern financial services, basic security principles for
PINs and for PIN entry devices (PIN pads) are specified in ISO
9564-1 [12]. Since PINs could suffer of shoulder surfing attacks
[19], [14], [15], to mitigate that, guidelines [12] indicates
that values of entered PIN shall not be displayed in plain
text or be disclosed by audible feedback. In order to reach
a compromise between usability and security, the common
behavior of interfaces/devices is to mask video feedback [6]
and to provide always the same feedback sound for all keys.
In particular, that assumes that recording sound feedback does
not give any additional information about the PIN.
In this paper we demonstrate it is possible to obtain informa-
tion about the PIN from the feedback sound by deducing the
inter-keystroke timing. Unlike a direct attack (input-based), in
which the adversary observes the PIN pad while the user enters
the code, the sound recording (output-based) does not require a
direct view of the input device. This gives to the adversary a sig-
nificant advantage in terms of exposure: making the adversary
difficult to identify. For example, the adversary can record the
feedback sound of an ATM maintaining te courtesy distance.
No special devices are required for sound recording, but a
smartphone or a voice recorder may be sufficient. Leveraging
this attack, the adversary is able to reduce significantly the
attempts to guess the victim’s PIN with respect to a random
guessing. In this paper, we extend the inter-keystroke timing
algorithm presented in [5] with several additional information
that can drastically reduce the attempts to guess the PIN:
1) Knowledge about typing behavior: it is behavioral feature
that takes into account how a user interacts with the PIN
pad (e.g., user types the PIN always with the same finger).
This information can be easily acquired by observing
the victim in different contexts and not necessarily when
entering the PIN in a ATM, but in any situation in which
he interacts with a PIN pad (e.g., door-lockers, automatic
fuel pumps, laptop numeric keyboard).
2) Knowledge of one digit of the code: the adversary has
managed to spy the victim during the PIN entry and has
come into possession of the value and position of a number
in the code sequence. This information can be obtained by
observing the victim while entering the PIN. Depending
on the environment, input devices do not usually offer
an adequate coverage, resulting more vulnerable to input-
based shoulder surfing attack. Furthermore, PoS are often
used in crowded place where the user tends to be distracted
(e.g., supermarkets) and generally does not pay particular
attention during typing.
3) Knowledge of the values composing the PIN, but not their
order: one of the techniques applicable in this scenario
is the thermal attack. Once the victim has completed
his operations on ATM or PoS the adversary acquires a
thermal image of the PIN pad. Subsequently, through the
analysis of the heat map, the adversary can determine the
keys pressed. Thermal camera are on the market at low
cost (i.e., FLIR ONE Gen 3 camera costs less than $ 200
[1]) and can be also used as smartphone devices.
Contributions.
• We demonstrate that it is possible to retrieve fairly accurate
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2inter-keystroke timing information from recorded-audio
with common devices. We are able to correctly detect
98% of feedback sounds with an error of 0.13 +/- 6.66ms.
Furthermore, 75% of inter-keystroke timings extracted
by the software had absolute errors under 7.66ms.
• We study and analyze how the interaction behavior of the
user with the PIN pad affects the guessing of a PIN. We
show that users who type PINs with just one finger are
more vulnerable to an attack that exploits interkeystroke
timing. We also show how the combination of inter-
keystroke timing and single finger typist knowledge leads
to a 34-fold improvement over random guessing to guess
a PIN within the first 5 attempts.
• We propose and study, for the first time in the literature,
the application of inter-keystroke timing to different
types of attacks. We show that inter-keystroke timing
significantly improves performance for each attack. For
example, applying inter-keystroke timing to Thermal
Attack we are able to guess 15% of the PINs at the first
attempt, reaching a fourfold improvement in performance.
We also show how the combination of multiple attacks
can dramatically reduce attempts to guess the PIN. We are
able to guess 72% of the PINs within the first 3 attempts.
• In this work, we show how the inter-keystroke timing is a
factor that influences the probability distribution of PINs,
making some of them much more likely than others.
This poses a serious security problem for PIN-based
authentication devices.
Organization. Section II overviews state-of-the-art in
password guessing based on acoustic attacks and on non-
acoustic side channel attacks. Section III presents our system
and the adversary model. Section IV describes an algorithm
to extract inter-keystroke timing from an audio signal. In
Section V we report our results in PIN guessing, merging
different types of knowledge about the PIN. In Section VI
we analyse how the different types of knowledge affect the
randomness of PINs. The paper concludes with the summary
and future work directions in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Non-acoustic side channel-attacks represent a type of ap-
proach to password inference. Vuagnoux and Pasini [22]
showed how it is possible to recover keystrokes by analysing
the electromagnetic waves emitted by the electrical components
of the keyboard. Marquardt et al. [17] collected with an
accelerometer the vibrations caused by the surface under the
keyboard while typing to infer the pressed keys. Other attacks
focused on motion detection using embedded sensors on mobile
devices. Sarkisyan et al.[20] and Wang et al. [23] inferred smart-
phone PINs through the analysis of smartwatch motion sensors
such as accelerometers and magnetometers. All the attacks
presented so far in this section, implys that the adversary must
acquire the information when the user is entering the password.
However, there are attacks that allow to obtain information
about the password seconds after it has been typed. These non-
acoustic attacks are based on thermal heat transfer and thermal
emanation. They were introduced for the first time by Zalewski
[26]. Every time a user presses a key the heat of the finger is
transferred to the keyboard and can be recorded with a thermal
camera. Depending on the material of the keyboard, thermal
residues have a different dissipation speed [18], changing the
time window in which the attack can be effective. Abdelrahman
et al. [2] evaluated how different PINs and patterns on mobile
device can influence thermal attack performance. Kaczmarek et
al. [13] demonstrate how a thermal attack can recover precise
information about a password within 30 seconds it was entered
and partial information within 60 seconds.
Acoustic attacks represent another type of approach
to password inference. The first to study vulnerability
on keyboard, relying on the fact that each key emits a
characteristic sound, were Asonov and Agrawal [4]. They
trained a neural network on features extracted by the recorded
audio signal to classify each key pressed. Subsequent work
showed the efficacy of sound emanation. Berger et al. [8]
combined keyboard acoustic emanation with a dictionary
attack to reconstruct single words, while Halevi and Saxena
[11] studied keyboard acoustic emanations to eavesdrop over
random password. Unfortunately the recognition of the keys
pressed by identifying the particular sound that each of them
produces cannot be taken into consideration in our case.
Another kind of acoustic attacks is based on time difference
of arrivals (TDoA) [27], [25], [16]. They rely on multiple
microphones recording where TDoA is used to triangulate
the position of the pressed key. This type of attacks, although
allow to obtain a good accuracy, are difficult to implement
in real situations. Involved hardware and environmental
preparation could limit their applicability. Song et al. [21]
presented an attack based on latency between subsequent key
pressed, showing that information about inter-keystroke timing
can be used to substantially narrow the search space. A similar
approach was used by Balagani et al. [6] who deduced inter-
keystroke timing from the time of appearance on the video
of the masking symbols when a user is typing a password.
The closest work to this paper is [5], in which is
demonstrated that precise inter-keystroke timing information
drastically reduce attempts to guess a PIN. Moreover, deducing
information of inter-keystroke timing from videos can reduce
up to 26 times the number of attempts to guess a PIN
compared to random guessing. The limitation of [5] is the
use of cameras to record the ATM screen while a user was
entering the PIN. This reduces the number of devices that can
be attacked to those that actually show clear graphic feedback,
making other PIN based devices very difficult to attack (i.e.
PoS has very small and dim screens).
In this paper we combine inter-keystroke timing deduced
from sound recording with other information deduced from
other plausible attacks in a real context. This setting can
be applied to a multitude of devices that can be attacked,
drastically reducing the attempts to guess a PIN compared
to [5]. To our knowledge there is no other work that use the
strategy presented in this paper, making our attack scenario
unexplored. The simple setting of this attack makes it easy
to apply in real contexts, posing immediate and serious
implications in systems like ATM or PoS.
3III. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
In this paper, we modeled an authentication system via
Personal Identification Number (PIN) that simulates the log-
in process of an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) through
interaction with a PIN pad (input device). For each key pressed
when entering the secret code, the user immediately receives a
feedback sound (output). Duration and frequency of the sound
do not depend on the key pressed and are always constant,
following ISO 9564-1 standard [12]. The goal of the adversary
is to learn the victims PIN. The adversary can record the output
without having visibility of the input device or the screen. Since
a direct view of the PIN pad is not necessary, information can
also be obtained even if the victim covers it with his hand while
entering the code. Furthermore, in order to record the feedback
sound, the adversary can be located at a distance of a couple of
meters, also in a noisy enviroment. This attack setting can be
referred to a multitude of real situations in which the adversary
uses a common recording device (such as a smartphone): 1)
the user is withdrawing from an ATM using bank card and the
adversary is waiting in line for his turn; 2) a customer is paying
in a shop via PoS and the adversary is near the device; 3) the
victim is opening a door with a electronic PIN lock. In this case
the adversary could have a hidden recording device and turn his
back to the victim. Furthermore, the adversary may not even
be physically close to the victim. For example: 1) the adversary
has access to the audio of cameras present in the proximity of
a terminal that requires authentication via PIN; 2) the adversary
hides a recording device, which can also be accessed remotely,
near an ATM or any device provided with a PIN authentication
method. We have also identified several information leakage
about the user or the PIN the adversary can exploit in the attack:
1) Knowledge about typing behavior.
2) Knowledge of one digit of the code.
3) Knowledge of the values composing the PIN, but not
their order.
4) Knowledge about typing behavior and knowledge of one
digit of the code: in this scenario the adversary is in posses-
sion of both the information described in points 1 and 2.
5) Knowledge about typing behavior and knowledge of
the values composing the PIN, but not their order: in
this scenario, the adversary is in possession of both the
information described in points 1 and 3.
6) Knowledge of the values composing the PIN, but not
their order and knowledge of one digit of the code: in
this scenario, the adversary is in possession of both the
information described in points 2 and 3.
7) Knowledge about typing behavior, knowledge of one
digit of the code and knowledge of the values composing
the PIN, but not their order: in this scenario the adversary
is in possession of all the information described in points
1, 2 and 3.
The full attack proceeds as shown in Figure 1:
IV. KEY-STROKE DETECTION THROUGH SOUND ANALYSIS
We used the same dataset presented in [6] to infer inter-
keystroke timing. Twentytwo participants were asked to type
4-digit PINS on a simulated ATM. Nineteen of them completed
STEP 2
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sound
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Inferring the 
PIN
Record the 
audio signal 
while the 
victim is typing 
her PIN.
Determine the 
PIN sequence 
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through an ad-
hoc software.
STEP 1
Spying the 
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STEP 3
Observing the 
PIN pad
STEP 5
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information
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possible.
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results of 
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Step 1 and   
Step 3.
Fig. 1. Attack sequence.
the full task consisting of three data collection sessions while
3 completed only one session. For each session participants
had to digit a total of 180 PINs following this procedure:
1) The participant memorizes a 4-digit PIN that appears on
the screen for 10 seconds.
2) Once the PIN in point 1 disappears, the participant types
it 4 times.
3) Points 1 and 2 are repeated 15 times.
4) The sequence described in points 1, 2 and 3 is repeated
3 times using the same PINs. As a result, each PIN is
typed 12 times per session.
Whenever a participant pressed a key, the ATM simulator
emitted a feedback sound and logged the relative timestamp
with millisecond precision. Sessions were recorded in a noisy
environment (SNR -15 dB) with a Sony FDR-AX53 camera
located 1.5 m away from the PIN pad. Audio signal was
acquired with a sampling frequency of 48000 Hz.
We developed a software to analyze the audio recorded and
to detect the instant in which a key was pressed. The signal was
linearly normalized in amplitude in an interval ranging from -1
to +1. We applied a 16 order Butterworth band-pass filter [10]
centred at 5600 Hz to the recorded signal in order to isolate
the characteristic frequency window of the feedback sound.
We processed the filtered signal setting all the values below
a threshold of 0.01 in amplitude, to remove the residual noise
to 0. We then calculated the maximum across nearby values in
a sliding window of length 4800 samples (4799 overlapping
samples), corresponding to 100 milliseconds (one-tenth the
sampling frequency). To determine the length of the window we
evaluated the distance between consecutive timestamps logged
by the ATM simulator. These differences follow the probability
distribution showed in Figure 2, which can be modelled with
a gamma function. We set a threshold of 0.001 to discard
outliers that could cause the occurrence of false positive or
negative during sound processing. From this we deduced that
99.9% of the differences between timestamps were higher than
100ms (4800 samples). In Figure 3 we present the result of the
process described above. We extracted the timestamps of the
peaks of the processed signal and compared to the ground truth.
All the estimated values that differed by more than 25ms from
the real value were classified as errors. We than performed
the Anderson-Darling test [3] that confirmed the whiteness of
4the residuals. Our experiments show that our algorithm leads
to fairly accurate inter-keystroke timing information. It is able
to correctly detect 98% of feedback sound with an error of
0.13 +/- 6.66ms. Furthermore, 75% of inter-keystroke timings
extracted by the software had absolute errors under 7.66ms
(against 10ms of [6]), and 97% had errors under 13.06ms
(against 20ms of [6]).Figure 4 shows the errors distribution.
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V. PIN GUESSING
In this section we first introduce and describe an algorithm
for PIN-guessing[5], based on the relationship between
inter-keystroke timings and Euclidean Distance of consecutive
keys. Than we present our results applying this algorithm to
the scenarios introduced in Section III related to additional
information about the user or PIN.
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Fig. 4. Errors distribution of our sound extraction algorithm.
A. Base Attack
Base Attack [5] is an algorithm that ranks PINs from the esti-
mated distances between subsequent keys. Keys are considered
as nodes of a multigraph, while Euclidean Distances between
subsequent keys are considered as weighted edges. The possible
distances are: zero distance (0), distance one (1), distance two
(2), distance three (3), diagonal distance one (d1), diagonal dis-
tance two (d2); short diagonal distance (sd) and long diagonal
distance (ld). Only one distances triplet can be associated to a 4-
digit PIN (e.g., to PIN 5566 is associable the only triplet 0,1,0),
while more PINs can be associated to a triplet. Base Attack
removes all non-compliant path to the triplet received as input,
returning as output all the associated PINs to the input triplet
(e.g., for the input 0,3,0 the algorithm returns PINs 2200 and
0022). Base Attack significantly reduce the attempts to guess a
PIN, reaching a 26-fold improvement in peformance compared
to random guessing. Moreover, [5] demonstrates a correlation
between Euclidean Distance and inter-keystroke timings.
B. Knowledge of typing behavior
Base Attack demonstrate a correlation between inter-
keystroke timings and Euclidean Distance. However, it is
reasonable to expect that this correlation is linked to the way
users type the code. Suppose that the user has to enter a PIN
containing the keys 1 and 0 in sequence (e.g., 1099). Following
the configuration of our PIN pad, the Euclidean Distance
between keys 1 and 0 is the largest one and therefore we
expect the inter-keystroke timing to have relatively high values.
This is true if the user enters the first digit with one finger
and the next one always with the same, actually covering the
distance between one key and the other. It would no longer be
the case if, for example, he would type the first digit with the
index finger of the right hand and the second with the index
finger of the left hand. In this case the inter-keystroke timing
is supposed to be significantly shorter. To demonstrate this,
we first studied the behavior of the 22 participants and then
evaluated the contribution of this information to PIN guessing.
5We analyzed the 61 videos recorded in the data collection
phase and for each PIN entered by each user we noted the
typing behaviors, dividing them into: single finger or other. We
classified all the PINs entered always and only with the same
finger as single finger. This includes the codes entered with
the index finger only and those typed with the thumb only.
Single finger PIN (SFP) represent 70% of the total, of them,
92% were typed using the index while 8% are typed with the
thumb. The class other PIN (OP) represents the 30% of the
total. This class can be divided in the following subclasses:
• Two hands PIN: PINs typed with at least a finger of the
left hand and at least a finger of the right hand. They
represents the 38% of the OP class.
• One hand PIN: PINs typed with at least two finger of
the same hand. They represents the 34% of the OP class.
• Unknown typing behavior PIN: all the PINs that we were
unable to classify with certainty due to the total or partial
coverage of the PIN pad during video recordings. They
represents the 28% of the OP class.
We found that 16 users on 22 (73%) typed more PINs
using a single finger (single finger typist - SFT), while the
remaining 6 (27%) typed more PINs using two hands or more
than a finger of one hand (other typist - OT). We have also
noticed that users have an attitude to enter PINs always in
the same way. In particular, SFT typed 89% of the time using
just one finger and OT typed 77% the time using 2 hands
or more finger of a hand. We split our keystroke dataset in
two sets. The first (training set) consists of 5195 PIN, typed
by 11 participants. The second (testing set) consists of 5135
PIN, typed by a distinct set of 11 participants and filtered by
SFP (3461 PINs) and OP (1674 PINs). Figure 5 shows the
effectiveness of knowing if a PIN is typed with only one finger
compared to Base Attack, to OP and to random guessing. Our
results show a significant difference between SFP and OP,
while a more limited improvement between SFP and Base
Attack (see FIgure 5). In particular, the percentage of PIN
recovered within 5 attempts is doubled if the code is an STP
instead of an OP. Moreover SFP shows a 34-fold improvement
compared to random guessing to guess PINs within 5 attempts.
C. Knowledge of one digit and its position in the code
We assume that the adversary has come into possession of
the value and the position of one digit from the PIN (VPK-
Value-Position Knowledge). We investigated how effective
VPK is on real data, compared to RGVPK random guessing
value-position knowledge. We split our keystroke dataset in
two sets. The first (training set) consists of 5195 PIN, typed by
11 participants. The second (testing set) consists of 5135 PIN,
typed by a distinct set of 11 participants. For each PIN in the
testing set, we associated a list of triplets of distances sorted
by their probability, like for the Base Attack. For each input
triplets the algorithm returns a set of associated PINs. Since we
are in possession of both the value and the position of a digit
of the PIN, we filtered the output removing the sequences that
were not compliant. For instance, given estimated distances 3,
0, and
√
2, the possible associated PINs are: 0007, 0009, 2224
and 2226. If we know that the first digit of the real PIN is
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Fig. 5. CDF showing the percentage of PINs recovered with a Base Attack (BA)
compared to Single Finger PIN (SFP), Other PIN (OP) and the baseline (RG) .
2, we can restrict the scope to 2224 and 2226. Figure 6 shows
the effectiveness of this algorithm comparing VPK to RGVPK.
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Knowledge of the first digit (VPK1) , compared to random guessing value-
position knowledge (RGVPK), Base Attack (BA) and Random Guessing (RG).
The knowledge of a digit of a 4-digit PIN and its position, re-
gardless of which is the first, second, third or fourth, reduces the
number of PINs to be guessed from 10,000 to 1,000. This also
applies theoretically to both the CDF of RGVPK and the CDF
of VPK. In a real context, for the adversary, it is easier to get the
value of the first digit of the PIN than the other 3. However, we
wanted to investigate in our data set whether the knowledge of
the position and of the respective digit was influential. We then
performed 4 VPK attacks, varying the known position of the
digit: VPK1 knowledge of the first digit, VPK2 knowledge of
the second digit, VPK3 knowledge of the third digit and VPK4
knowledge of the fourth digit. Results are shown in Figure 7.
We performed a series of χ2 tests to evaluate differences
in the frequency of the PINs guessed for the 4 attacks. We
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Fig. 7. Percentage of PIN guessed knowing the first digit (VPK1), the second
digit (VPK2), the third digit (VPK3) and the fourth digit (VPK4).
found that:
• The χ2 statistic for VPK1 and VPK2 resulted significant
at p<0.01 for the firsts 14 attempts.
• The χ2 statistic for VPK1 and VPK3 resulted significant
at p<0.01 for the firsts 31 attempts.
• The χ2 statistic for VPK1 and VPK4 never resulted
significant (p>0.01).
• The χ2 statistic for VPK2 and VPK3 resulted significant
at p<0.01 for the firsts 6 attempts.
• The χ2 statistic for VPK2 and VPK4 resulted significant
at p<0.01 for the firsts 8 attempts.
• The χ2 statistic for VPK3 and VPK4 resulted significant
at p<0.01 for the firsts 16 attempts.
Results show that, for our data, the knowledge of the
position significantly influences the percentage of PINs
guessed by the algorithm. In particular, knowing the first or
the fourth digit gives more information than the other two
digits, while the knowledge of the third digit generally gives
a smaller contribution compared to others.
D. Knowledge of the values composing the PIN, but not their
order
In this scenario, we assume that the adversary is aware of
the keys pressed by the victim, but not of the temporal order
in which they were pressed. This type of knowledge can be
obtained by spreading powder on the PIN pad. Than, once the
victim has finished her operations, the adversary can check
the keys in which the powder has been removed. Another way
to retrive the information of the values composing the PIN
is a Thermal Attack (TA). As described in [13], the adversary,
using a thermal camera, records the heat footprint (heatmap)
left by the victim on the PIN pad once she has finished her
operation. In this work we want to investigate the contribution
of this knowledge on real data, combining it with the Base
Attack. Suppose that the conditions allow the adversary to
perform a TA on the PIN pad. He must therefore be in one
of the following situations:
1) The heatmap shows only one heat zone, the victim then
typed the same key 4 times (Class 1). Suppose that the
adversary deduces from the heatmap that the victim has
typed key 5. The only PIN that can be associated in this
context is 5555. In Class 1 the number of possible PINs
is reduced to 1.
2) The heatmap shows 2 distinct heat zones, this means that
the victim typed 2 different digits, repeating both twice or
repeating one of them for 3 times (Class 2). Suppose that
the adversary deduces from the heatmap that the victim has
typed keys 0 and 2. Among the PINs that can be associated
there are, for example, 0022, 0202, 0002, etc.. In Class 2
the number of possible PINs is equal to the permutations
of 2 values (A and B) in 4 extractions excluding the AAAA
and BBBB combinations that belong to Class1. The num-
ber of possible PINs is therefore reduced to 14 (24 − 2).
3) The heatmap shows 3 distinct heat zones, this means
that the victim typed 3 different digits one of which
was repeated twice (Class 3). Suppose that the adversary
deduces from the heatmap that the victim has typed keys 0,
2 and 5. Among the PINs that can be associated there are,
for example, 0255, 0225, 5502, etc.. In Class 3 the number
of possible PINs is equal to the permutations in four
extractions of the three digits deduced from the heatmap
for the number of permutations of the repeated digit. The
number of possible PINs is therefore reduced to 36 (4·3·3).
4) The heatmap shows 4 distinct heat zones, this means that
the victim typed 4 different digits (Class 4). Suppose that
the adversary deduces from the heatmap that the victim
has typed keys 0, 2, 5 and 8. Among the PINs that can
be associated there are, for example, 0258, 2580, 0852,
etc.. In Class 4 the number of possible PINs is equal to
the simple permutations of 4 elements. The number of
possible PINs is therefore reduced to 24 (4!).
We applied this information to the test set composed of
5195 PIN, typed by 11 participants, while the other 5135
PINs composed by 11 participants were used to train the Base
Attack. We first classified each PIN (input) of our test set as
described above (i.e. 1038 was classified as Class 4 and 1004
was classified as Class 3). For each input we associated an
array of all the PINs belonging to the same class and having
the same different digits. We than performed a Base Attack
filtering the output by removing all the PINs not included in
the associated array. Figure 8 shows the effectiveness of this
algorithm comparing TA to Random Guess Thermal (RGT).
E. Multple Attacks
Knowledge of one digit and its position in the code and of
typing behavior. We suppose that the adversary has come into
possession of the value and the position of a digit in the code
sequence (VPK) and that the PIN was a SFP (see Section V-B).
We investigated on real data how effective the combination of
this knowledge is. We considered as testing set 3461 PINs typed
by 11 participants containing only SFP as described in Section
V-B. We than performed to this testing set the VPK algorithm.
Figure 9 shows the effectiveness of this algorithm comparing
the results to VPK and to RGVPK. Results show that the
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knowledge of typing behavior allows to improve considerably
the performances for VPK 9. In particular, within the first 5 at-
tempts VPK+STP algorithm can guess 25% more PINs respect
to VPK. Moreover, VPK+STP shows a 11-fold improvement
compared to RGVPK to guess PINs within 10 attempts.
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Knowledge of the first digit (VPK1) , VPK1+ SFP (Single Finger PIN) and
Random Guessing Value-Position Knowledge (RGVPK).
Knowledge of the values composing the PIN, but not
their order and of typing behavior We suppose that the
adversary is aware of the keys pressed by the victim, but not
of the temporal order in which they were pressed (Thermal
Attack) and knows also that the typed PIN was a SFP (see
Section V-B). We investigated on real data how effective the
combination of this knowledge is. We considered as testing
set 3461 PINs typed by 11 participants containing only SFPs
as described in Section V-B. We than performed to this testing
set the Thermal algorithm. Figure 10 shows the effectiveness
of this algorithm (Thermal+SFP) comparing the results to
Thermal Attack and to Random Guess Thermal.
Knowledge of the keys pressed when entering the code,
but not the order except for one digit We suppose that the
adversary is aware of the keys pressed by the victim, but not
of the temporal order in which they were pressed (Thermal
Attack) and knows also the position of one digit (VPK). In
this scenario we performed the VPK and thermal algorithms in
sequence. Figure 11 shows the effectiveness of this algorithm
comparing Thermal+VPK to Thermal Attack and to Random
Guess Thermal.
Knowledge of the keys pressed when entering the code,
but not their order except for one digit and of typing
behavior In this scenario it is assumed that the adversary is
in possession of all the information: typing behavior (SFP),
knowledge of one digit and its position in the code (VPK) and
knowledge of the keys pressed when entering the code, but not
the order (Thermal). We investigated on real data how effective
the combination of this knowledge is. We considered as testing
set 3461 PINs typed by 11 participants containing only SFPs
as described in Section V-B. We than performed to this testing
set VPK and thermal algorithms in sequence. Results show
that the knowledge of all the conditions described in this paper
and combined with the Base Attack, drastically increases the
chance of guessing the PIN (see Figure 11). In particular,
within the first 3 attempts, the algorithm can identify about
72% of PINs, offering an improvement of almost 2400 times
compared to Random Guessing.
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Fig. 10. CDF showing the percentage of PINs recovered with Thermal Attack
(TA), Random Guess Thermal (RGT) and TA + SFP (Single Finger PIN).
VI. PIN DISTRIBUTION
The distribution of PIN codes is a factor that determines
the security of systems that use this type of authentication.
If 4-digit PINs are uniformly distribuited, the probability that
any PIN is the correct one is 1 on 10,000 (0.01%). In other
words, an average of 5000 random attempts are required to
guess the PIN. In Section V we showed that, depending on the
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Fig. 11. CDF showing the percentage of PINs recovered with Thermal
Attack (TA), Random Guess Thermal + VPK (RGTVPK) ,TA+ VPK1 and
TA + VPK1 + SFP (ALL).
information held by the adversary, it is possible to significantly
reduce the number of attempts required to guess a PIN. The
question we pose now is: does this information make a PIN
more likely than another and therefore less secure?
As described in [5] each input triplet of distances has a basket
of PINs that can be associated. For instance the triplet 0, 0, 0 has
10 associated PINs (i.e. 0000, 1111), while the triplet 1,1,1 has
216 associated PINs(i.e 0258, 4569). This heterogeneity makes
some PINs more likely than others. Suppose that the adversary
has succeeded in associating the exact Euclidean distance to
each inter-keystroke timing, without errors. If the victim’s real
PIN is 5555, the triplet of input distances corresponds to 0, 0,
0. As we said, this triplet has 10 PINs associated and so the
average attempts to guess the PIN are 5.5. Suppose instead that
the real PIN is 8520, the triplet of input distances is 1,1,1. In
this case the associated PINs are 216 and the average attempts
to guess the PIN are 108.5. We can therefore affirm that the
Base Attack affects the probability distribution for PINs. We
verified this theory on real data. In this case the adversary, due
to the overlap of inter-keystroke timing distributions [5], is not
able to correctly estimate distances between keys, introducing
a classification error. Our dataset consists of 44 PINs chosen
to verify the correlation between inter-keystroke timing and
Euclidean distance as described in [6]. For each PIN we applied
the Base Attack and calculated the number of attempts neces-
sary to reach the 50% probability to guess the PIN (P50). Table
I shows the 5 PINs with the lowest number of attempts for P50.
The knowledge of one digit of the code and of the typing
behavior do not directly affect the distribution, although they
significantly reduce the number of attempts to guess a PIN. The
knowledge of one digit of the code allows to uniformly reduce
the range of possible PINs from 10,000 to 1,000. For example,
PIN 2200 and PIN 5555 have the same probability of 0.1% to
be guessed at the first attempt. However, in Section V-C we
have seen that for our dataset, by applying the Base Attack
to the knowledge of one digit of the code, the percentage of
PINs guessed varies according to the position. In particular,
knowing the first digit of the code (VPK1) or the fourth digit
(VPK4) allows to significantly increase the percentage of PINs
guessed in the first 10 attempts. This happens because VPK1
and VPK4 reduce classification error of the distances passed
in input to the Base Attack more significantly than VPK2 or
VPK3. However, this does not have a substantial reflection
on the probability distribution of the PINs. As can be seen
in Table I, 4 on 5 PINs appear in the top 5 of both the BA
and VPK1 algorithms, keeping the same positions. PINs 1038
(fourth in BA) and 3302 (fourth in VPK1), occupy the sixth
position in VPK1 and in BA respectively.
The typing behavior is an information that can only be used
in combination with the Base Attack (SFP). This knowledge
increases the accuracy of the attack, but does not significantly
affect the probability distribution of PINs. As reported in
Table I, 4 on 5 PINs appear in the top 5 of both the BA
and SFP algorithms, keeping also the same positions. PIN
8556 (fifth in BA) and 2016 (third in SFP), occupy the ninth
position in SFP and in BA respectively.
Another information that affects the probability distribution
of PINs is the knowledge of the values composing the code. In
Section V-D we described the 4 possible classes to which each
PIN belongs. This shows how, depending on the class, the prob-
ability of each PIN changes. In particular, PINs belonging to
Class 1 are the most probable, while those belonging to Class 3
are the least probable. Table I reports the top 5 PINs ranking for
our dataset, as the results of the combination of the knowledge
of the values composing the PIN with the Base Attack (TA).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown that inter-keystroke timing
retrieved from the feedback sound emitted by a PIN pad, can
be effectively used to reduce the attempts to guess a PIN.
We are able to correctly detect 98% of feedback sound with
an error of 0.13 +/- 6.66ms. We combined inter-keystroke
timing with other information deduced from other plausible
attacks in a real context. We demonstrated that inter-keystroke
timing significantly improves performance for any attack: 1)
if the adversary has come into possession of the value and
the position of one digit from the PIN, inter-keystroke timing
allows to reach a 14-fold improvement in performance within
the first 5 attempts; 2) applying inter-keystroke timing to
Thermal Attack allows to guess 15% of the PINs at the first
attempt, reaching a 4-fold improvement in performance.
We have demonstrated that the knowledge of typing behavior,
combined with the inter-keystroke timing information, reduces
number of attempts needed to guess the PIN. In particular, if a
PIN is typed always with the same finger (SFP) the adversary
is able to guess it with a lower number of attempts compared
to a PIN entered with multiple fingers or two hands (OP).
Our results show that knowledge of SFP leads to a 34-fold
improvement compared to random guessing, resulting in PINs
guessed within 5 attempts. Moreover, among the users that
participated in our study, 73% prefer to type the PIN using
only one finger, while the remaining 27% type using more
fingers than a hand or two hands.
9TABLE I
TOP 5 PIN FOR BASE ATTACK (BA), SINGLE FINGER PIN (SFP), VALUE-POSITION KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST DIGIT (VPK1), THERMAL ATTACK (TA)
AND NUMBER OF ATTEMPTS (ATT.) NECESSARY TO REACH THE 50% PROBABILITY TO GUESS THE PIN
BA SFP VPK1 TA
PIN Att PIN Att PIN Att PIN Att
2200 44 2200 6 2200 5 0489 1
5555 87 1004 29 5555 5 5555 1
1004 135 2016 85 1004 24 8556 1
1038 213 1038 87 3302 30 9999 1
8556 354 5555 95 8556 30 1004 2
We have shown how the combination of multiple attacks can
dramatically reduce attempts to guess the PIN. In particular,
we were able to guess 72% of the PINs within the first 3
attempts, and almost 90% of the PINs within 5 attempts. Our
results highlight a real threat to PIN authentication systems.
The feasibility of the attack and its immediate applicability in
real scenarios poses a considerable security threat for ATMs,
PoS-s, and similar devices.
Finally, we have shown how the knowledge of inter-keystroke
timing significantly improves the guessing probability of
certain subsets of PINs. This poses a serious problem in the
security of these classes of PINs, and as a result our work
suggests that secre PIN generation must take this into account.
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